xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Fri, 19 Aug 2016 14:08:10 +0000 (15:08 +0100)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Fri, 19 Aug 2016 17:40:11 +0000 (18:40 +0100)
commit2a99aa99fc84a45f505f84802af56b006d14c52e
tree6174e1912b8b96ed782f712acd76be6dcd843d8a
parentf2c060fc972b1cb7aa7a1be35508a9ebfd564fdc
xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

PoD is supposed to be entirely transparent to guest, but this interface has
been left exposed for a long time.

The use of PoD requires careful co-ordination by the toolstack with the
XENMEM_{get,set}_pod_target hypercalls, and xenstore ballooning target.  The
best a guest can do without toolstack cooperation crash.

Furthermore, there are combinations of features (e.g. c/s c63868ff "libxl:
disallow PCI device assignment for HVM guest when PoD is enabled") which a
toolstack might wish to explicitly prohibit (in this case, because the two
simply don't function in combination).  In such cases, the guest mustn't be
able to subvert the configuration chosen by the toolstack.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen/common/memory.c